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ABSTRACT
Family- and child-related topics in China have drawn wide attention from the public and schol-
ars. A number of studies have been interested in the impact of the recent change from the one-child
policy to the two-child policy in 2016 in China. The new policy raised births by 1.31 million in
China in 2016 shortly. Births then decreased by 0.63 million in 2017. The government originally
estimated the new policy would increase 3 million newborns annually in the five or six years fol-
lowing the policy change; however, the estimate did not take into account the low willingness of
having a first child. The increase in 2016 fell far short of the government’s target and could not
compensate the decrease in the willingness of having a first child. According to fertility inten-
tion and behavior surveys conducted in China, the low willingness of having a child or having
an additional child was attributed to the soaring costs of raising children. Cost estimates of rais-
ing children can provide an important insight into how children affect family economic decisions.
In China, couples with two children are over-represented by a lowly-educated, rural, and sons-
preferred population. This is commonly attributed to an exemption in the one-child policy: only
particular couples could have a second child, and these couples were disadvantaged, lived in ru-
ral areas, and had a strong preference for sons. Using data from the Survey and Research Center
for China Household Finance at Southwestern University of Finance and Economics conducted
in 2011, I employ a selection bias correction and equivalence scale method to estimate the costs
of raising children that consider economies of scale enjoyed by a couple living with children. I
find no difference between the costs of raising a son and a daughter for a representative one-child
family. The marginal cost of raising an additional child was higher for a representative couple with
a firstborn daughter and a second-born son than a couple with children of the same gender. To raise
an additional child, on average, the cost was higher for an urban family than a rural one, and the
cost was higher for a couple with more years of schooling than one with fewer years of education.
Besides the family planning policy, another subject-matter of concern is China’s unequal access
to educational resources among children from different backgrounds – rich and poor, urban and ru-
ii
ral. Many countries have introduced conditional cash transfer programs, which provide incentives
to relatively disadvantaged individuals or households when specific requirements are met. I eval-
uate the impact of a social experiment, the Youth Education Improvement Program, designed to
improve youth’s academic achievement in a neediest area through conditional cash transfers. The
estimates show that the incentive had positive impacts on student performance in both standard-
ized Chinese and mathematics examinations when using a sample with balanced characteristics.
I also estimate the impacts by baseline performance and find the most significant effects of the
monetary incentives for students with a relatively low baseline score while finding no significant
impacts for students with a relatively high baseline score. Results using a sample with unbalanced
characteristics yield no significant impacts across different baseline scores.
iii
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1. INTRODUCTION
Family- and child-related topics in China have drawn wide attention from the public and schol-
ars. A number of studies have been interested in the impact of the recent change from the one-child
policy to the two-child policy in China. Instead of studying the impact of the policy change, I in-
vestigate the costs of raising children that largely affects fertility decisions. Besides the family
planning policy, another subject-matter is China’s unequal access to educational resources among
children from different backgrounds – rich and poor, urban and rural. My study evaluates the im-
pact of a social experiment designed to improve youth’s academic achievement in neediest areas
in China through conditional cash transfers.
1.1 The Population Plan Policy
The government guidelines for population planning plays a vital role in affecting fertility de-
cisions in China. The increasing life expectancy and declining child mortality rate accelerated
China’s population growth and put a strain on economic development. In the 1970s the Chi-
nese government launched a campaign that promoted delaying marriage, a longer interval between
births, and having fewer children in response to the shortage of natural resources and the prob-
lem of poverty. As a result, the total fertility rate declined from 5.5 to 3.0 births per woman
before the implementation of the one-child policy. In 1978, birth planning was formally included
in China’s Constitution. China’s one-child policy was introduced between 1978 and 1980 to fur-
ther halt China’s high population growth. It officially restricted the number of children per family
across most provinces. Families who lived in provinces of rural western China, such as, Yunnan,
Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang, were exempt from the policy restriction. Ethnic minorities and
families with special circumstances were also exempted. Beginning in late 1982, local officials in
rural areas were given the authority to grant approvals for having a second child if both the hus-
band and wife were only children. This policy relaxation had a minor impact at that time due to the
majority of couples being born from multi-child families. Between 1985 and 2011, the majority
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of provinces successively decreed that rural families with financial or other difficulties could apply
to have a second child (after a specified birth spacing) if the firstborn was a daughter. The World
Bank World Development Indicators show that as of 2015 the total fertility rate in China dropped
to 1.6 births per woman while the world average was 2.5 births per woman.
A further loosening of the one-child policy in 2014 allowed a family to apply for having a
second a child if either the husband or wife was an only child. According to the Chinese National
Health and Family Planning Commission, among the additional 11 million families that were ben-
efited from the loosening of the policy restriction from having a second child, only about 1 million
families applied to have a second child by the end of 2014. This number was half of the govern-
ment’s estimate of 2 million applicant families each year. In 2014, most couples who were born
between 1978 and 1986 when the one-child policy was enacted (aged between 28 and 36 years old)
were eligible to have a second child under the loosened policy due to them being very likely to be
an only child in their families of origin. To legally have a second child, an eligible family would
have applied with the government. The low number of applicants might provides some evidence
that families may not have been willing to have a second child due to reasons other than the policy
restriction.
The Chinese National Health and Family Planning Commission credited the one-child policy
with successfully mitigating the stress of overpopulation on economic development and natural
resources by preventing 400 million births as of 2014. This drop in fertility rate also brought
the unique social phenomena – the imbalance in age and gender composition – in China. The
unbalanced sex ratio could be explained by the implementation of the one-child policy associated
with an intensified preference for a son, the diagnostic ultrasound for sex determination, and the
sex-selective abortion. According to the World Bank World Development Indicators, in 2015 the
Chinese sex ratio at birth was 115 boys to 100 girls compared to 107 boys to 100 girls in 1978. The
ratio was much larger in some western provinces of China. These numbers show a disproportionate
ratio in favor of boys when compared to the world average sex ratio at birth: 107 boys to 100 girls
in 2015. The abnormal sex ratio at birth has brought about a considerable shortage of women of
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marriageable age in China. According to the China National Bureau of Statistics, it is predicted
there will be around 30 million more men than women of marriageable age in China by 2020.
Another problem caused by the one-child policy is the aging population. The number of work-
ers aged 16 to 59 has begun to shrink by 3.71 million in 2014 compared to 2013 for the first time
in the past two decades. The working-age population is projected to continue shrinking every year.
This diminishing working-age population has to bear an enormous burden from supporting a large
number of elderly. A person who was born in the generation of the one-child policy has to provide
support for parents and likely to for four grandparents now, called the "4-2-1" problem. Since the
total fertility rate in China was only 1.6 births per woman in 2015 according to the World Bank,
the working-age population will keep shrinking. The word average was 2.5 births per woman in
2015. The replacement rate that leads to zero population growth is about two births per woman for
industrialized countries and has to be greater than 2.5 births per woman for developing countries
due to higher infant mortality rates. The combination of a low total fertility rate and the rapidly
aging population can destabilize the Chinese economy. The direct and indirect consequences of
the one-child policy have received great attention from the Chinese government.
Driven by fears that the unbalanced sex ratio and the aging population could cause social prob-
lems and hinder the economic growth, the Chinese government replaced the 35-year-old one-child
policy with a two-child policy on January 1, 2016. As a result, all couples nationwide can now
choose to have two children from here on forward. The objective of the new family planning policy
is to balance the male-to-female ratio and the elderly-to-workforce ratio in China by stimulating
the total fertility rate. Since the two-child policy was implemented, around 90 million additional
families became eligible to have an additional child. The government forecasted the policy would
lead to an additional 3 million births per year in the following five to six years since half of the
newly eligible women were older than 40 years old and some families might continue to choose to
have only one child regardless. According to China’s National Health and Family Planning Com-
mission, births increased by 1.31 million (7.9%) in 2016, which fell far short of the government’s
estimate. It is evident the new fertility policy has not stimulated the total fertility rate since the to-
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tal fertility rate remained at 1.6 births per woman in 2017, according to the World Bank. In 2017,
births decreased by 0.63 million as the increase in the second born children did not compensate the
decrease in the firstborn. Additionally, the working-age population continued shrinking, falling by
5.48 million in 2017 relative to 2016 according to the figure released by the China National Bureau
of Statistics. These factors led to the high sex ration level at birth in China, 115 boys to 100 girls
in 2017, according to the World Bank World Development Indicators.
In addition to many factors such as, demographic, sociological, bio-medical, family income,
consumption and saving, labor-force decision, and the benefit of having children, fertility decisions
are primarily affected by the cost of having children. The cost of raising children is thought to be
a substantial financial burden to most families, and the increased costs will decrease the number
of women who give birth to a second child. The idea that China’s two child-policy can induce
an increase in births has been proven to be overly optimistic. The two-child policy can bring the
extra number of births has been proven to be too optimistic. Although two children are widely
identified as the ideal number of children for a family in China, there is evidence of a difference
between this ideal number and the actual number of births that occur. This discrepancy between
fertility willingness and behavior has been widely observed in the literature. Mao (2009) uses data
from the Fertility Intention and Fertility Behavior Survey conducted in 2007 in Jiangsu Province
in China to document the differences between fertility beliefs and result. Mao found that 2% of
the women had an actual number of children greater than the number they were willing to have,
53.9% of the women displayed actual fertility behavior that matches their intentions, and 44% of
the women gave birth to a fewer number of children than their willingness to have. Restricting
analysis to women who already had one child and who were allowed to have the second one, the
intended fertility rate was 1.47 while the actual fertility rate was only 1.01. The expected fertility
rate was between 1.26 and 1.1s when future fertility plan was taken into account. Mao and Hao
(2013) use data from the Fertility Intention and Fertility Behavior Survey conducted in 2010 in
Jiangsu Province and suggest that of couples who were eligible to have a second child, 53.3%
of women thought one child was ideal and had one child. Moreover, 6.25% identified a 2-child
4
family with two children as ideal and had two children while 39.91% thought a two-child family
as ideal but only had one child. Zhang (2016) uses survey data conducted by the Tianjin Academy
of Social Science in 2015 in the city of Beijing and documents that while 73.2% of married and
unmarried respondents identified two children as ideal, only 15.4% of married respondents who
already had a child considered having another one (84.6% did not plan to have a second child).
Furthermore, of the 15.4% of married respondents who already had a child and were considering
have another one, 3% had already become pregnant with a second one, 61.2% made plans to have
a second, and 35.8% had no plans to have a second one yet. Of the 84.6% respondents who already
had a child and did not consider having a second one (22% were aged more than 36 years old),
19.9% thought that one child had already been a significant financial burden or worried about the
economic pressures a second one could bring Further, 17.9% turned out to not be eligible to have
a second child due to the policy restriction, 15.4% identified one child as ideal, and 13.1% thought
having a second child would be tiring since they were also caring for an older child. Apparently,
the policy restriction is not the only key factor that affected fertility decisions for the past decade.
Demographic, sociological, bio-medical, and economic characteristics, labor-force decision, and
the cost and benefit of having children are all factors that may affect fertility decisions (Willis,
1973). Among all these determinants, one of the most cited reasons for having only one child is
the soaring cost of raising an additional child.
Governments in many countries offer various supporting programs, subsidies, or tax credits to
help families ease the financial burden of raising children. Many economic models of fertility fol-
lowing Becker (1960) have studied the impact of the cost of raising children on fertility decisions.
There is also much literature that studies the effect of economic incentives on fertility. Buttner and
Lutz (1990) observe a jump in fertility rates between 1976 and 1978 in response to the pronatalist
social policy package introduced by the German Democratic Republic in 1976. Hoem (1990) and
Walker (1995) examine the effect of pronatalist policies that were designed to provide financial
incentives for encouraging childbearing and shorten the spacing of births in Sweden. Hyatt and
Milne (1991) and Zhang et al. (1994) both use a time series model to estimate the possible impact
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of the personal tax exemption for children, child tax credit, and family allowances on the total fer-
tility rate. They find evidence that the three tax-transfer programs positively affect the total fertility
pattern in Canada. Whittington et al. (1990), Whittington (1992), and Whittington (1993) find ev-
idence that tax policies that benefit families with children did change the total fertility rate in the
United States. Manski and Mayshar (2003) find that the child allowance and other related welfare
programs in Israel may play an essential role in the puzzle of Israel’s fertility reversion. However,
the time series approach used in the literature mentioned above leaves the identification vulnerable
to trends in unobserved variables. If unobserved characteristics related to childbearing decisions
change over time, the time series variation may not be sufficient to identify the effect of the prona-
talist policies. The following three studies use individual-level data and identify a positive effect
of the pronatalist policies. Milligan (2005) finds that the introduction of a child tax subsidy in the
1990s, in the province of Quebec, Canada, had a significant, positive effect on fertility outcomes.
In the analysis, Milligan compares fertility outcomes in the province of Quebec to other provinces
over the same period. Cohen et al. (2013) find that financial incentives provided by government
policies encouraged families to have another child by using panel data from Israel’s Central Bu-
reau of Statistic. Laroque and Salanié (2014) use data from the French Labor Force Survey and
the French tax-benefit system and find that tax incentives affect fertility decision for both the first
and the third child in France. In the past, a fine of 3-10 times the annual salary of a couple had to
be paid to the government to have children more than permitted in China.
It seems that China’s two-child policy is unable to spur births to the level estimated by the
government. Estimating the costs of raising children can provide essential references to determine
the method of support and the level of subsidy or tax credits in the future. The cost of raising
children can be divided into two major groups: direct and indirect costs. Direct costs include
additional expenditures incurred by a family due to the presence of children, such as food, clothing,
child care, education, housing, etc. Indirect costs refer to opportunity costs. Examples include
income forgone by parents as a result of leaving work, parents’ career prospects affected, hours
working declining, or changes in working types to accompany children. In my essay, I focus on
6
the issue of measuring the direct material cost of raising children.
In most countries, there is no policy restriction on the number of children a couple can have.
However, families with two children have characteristics that are dissimilar to families with one
child due to the one-child policy, which began in the 1970s. Families with two children are over-
represented by lower-educated couples residing in rural areas as the one-child policy were strictly
applied to couples with relatively higher earnings residing in urban areas in China. While 48.55%
of the couples with one child both received more than 12 years of education, only 5.57% of the
couples with two children received more than 12 years of schooling in my sample that represents
the population in China. 75.07% of the families with one child lived in urban areas, and 32.74%
of the families with two children resided in urban areas. The cost of two children is observed
for only restricted nonrandom subgroups as a result of the one-child policy. When the probability
that a particular couple has a second child under the one-child policy depends on variables that
also affect the share of the second child on household’s total expenditure, there may exist sample
selection bias. Thus, the sample selection bias has to be considered when estimating the cost of
two children. Finally, I find no difference between the costs for a representative couple for raising
a boy (9.71%) or a girl (9.96%). The marginal cost of raising an additional child is higher for a
representative couple with a firstborn girl and a second-born boy (33.40%) than with other gender
combinations of two children (9.74% to 9.99%). I find it costs an urban couple more to raise an
additional child than a rural couple and costs a higher-educated couple more than a lower-educated
couple.
The essay is organized as follows. In Section 2.1, I review some of the literature on measur-
ing the cost of raising children. Section 2.2 introduces the household behavioral models and the
assumptions for estimating the cost of raising children. In section 2.3, I turn to the empirical im-
plementation of the model. The correction of selection bias is presented in Section 2.4. Section
2.5 presents the data and empirical results. Section 2.6 concludes.
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1.2 Conditional Cash Transfers
Conditional cash transfer programs were invented as social assistance tools to motivate recipi-
ents’ investments in human capital with an over-arching goal of alleviating long-term poverty. The
primary mechanisms of conditional cash transfer programs are: easing the short-term financial
burden when changing behavior, increasing human capital accumulation, and preventing the inter-
generational transmission of poverty in the long-term. In many countries, conditional cash transfer
programs have been employed as policy instruments to deliver money to individuals and families
on the condition that those individuals and families fulfill pre-specified requirements. These re-
quirements are usually human capital investments, such as attending schools, performing well in
examinations, or having health check-ups. Incentive payments are usually made primarily to rela-
tively poor individuals or families for investments in human capital through education and health
as with relatively poor economics resources people tend to invest fewer resources than needed.
The theoretical basis for using conditional cash transfer as a motivator has been well researched.
Research on the implementation and impact of conditional cash transfer programs has been well
documented in many countries as well. In Latin America for example, many countries have various
versions of conditional cash transfer programs.
Mexico’s Progresa, launched in 1997 when Mexico was recovering from the economic crisis,
was the first national conditional cash transfer program. Prospera (named initially as Progresa)
was founded in 2002 with the aim of building human capital by providing incentive payments
directly to low-income families. Prospera specially targeted children’s and mothers’ educational,
health, and nutritional status. Progresa initially targeted only poor rural areas but later expanded
its coverage to poor urban areas. The program went from covering 300,000 families in 1997 when
the pilot program was launched to including about five million families in 2002 when the program
was revised. The program works by providing direct cash transfers every other month to female
heads of families as long as specified requirements are met. The conditional cash transfers vary
by a child’s gender and grade level to provide a stronger incentive for households to send girls
to school. Many studies have evaluated the impact of Prospera in Mexico, see Schultz (2000a),
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Schultz (2000b), Skoufias (2001), Schultz (2004), and de Brauw and Hoddinott (2011). Among
these studies, Schultz (2004) shows that the program had induced an increase in enrollment rates
in 1999 for relatively poor third- to ninth-graders and an increase in the number of schooling by
0.66 years, 0.72 years of additional education for girls and 0.64 years of education for boys.
In Brazil, conditional cash transfer programs have been the most common social assistance
tool since 1988. Several pre-existing conditional cash transfer programs were combined to form
Bolsa Família in 2001. The program initially benefited 6.7 million families and is currently the
largest conditional cash transfer program in the world, covering more than 25% of the Brazilian
population. Bolsa Família works by providing incentive payments made to poor households for
sending children to school and having children vaccinated. The objectives of Bolsa Família in-
clude eliminating child labor, raising school attendance rates, improving mothers’ and children’s
health status, and poverty. Conditional cash transfers are offered to female heads of the relatively
low-income families given the compliance of the pre-specified conditions. Compared to Mexico’s
Prospera, Bolsa Família is applied to citizens more generally. Glewwe and Kassouf (2012) eval-
uate the effects of Bolsa Família on enrollment, dropout rates, and grade promotion. They find
that the program raised enrollment by around 5.5% for first- to fourth-graders and by 6.5% for
fifth- to eighth-graders. In addition, dropout rates declined by 0.5 percentage points for first- to
fourth-graders graders and by 0.4 percentage points for fifth- to eighth-graders; grade promotion
rates increased by 0.9 percentage points in grades 1-4 and 0.3 percentage points in grades 5-8.
de Brauw et al. (2015) examines the impact of Bolsa Família and observes significantly positive
effects on enrollment and grade progression for only girls using survey conducted in 2005 and
2009. Girls’ enrollment rate was increased by 8.2 percentage points with their grade progression
rate increasing by 22.5 percentage points for girls aged 15-17 years old and by 14.6 percentage
points for girls aged 6-14 years old in rural areas. In urban areas, the program raised girls’ pro-
gression by 18.0 percentage points for those aged 15-17 years old but did not affect those aged 6-14
years old. Both Brazil’s Bolsa Família and Mexico’s Prospera programs attempts to alleviate the
short-term financial burden, increase human capital accumulation, and thus prevent the long-term
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inter-generational cycle of poverty.
Following the implementation of Mexico’s Prospera and Brazil’s Bolsa Família, most of the
countries in Latin America borrowed elements from Brazil and Mexico and adopted their own
conditional cash transfer programs as policy instruments to deliver social assistance. In other parts
of the world, many countries have also embraced conditional cash programs. Bangladesh, Cam-
bodia, Indonesia, Malawi, Morocco, Pakistan, South Africa, Turkey, the United States, among
others, have also adopted such monetary incentives as the policy instrument to alter recipients’ be-
havior. In Bangladesh and Cambodia, conditional cash transfers have been employed to alleviate
gender inequality in education. Chile and Turkey specifically target gender inequality in educa-
tion for poor households. Conditional cash transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa are used to improve
youth’s health and social protection. The Opportunity NYC-Family Rewards, a privately funded
conditional cash transfer program, is the first comprehensive conditional cash transfer program in
New York city that aims at improving children’s education, family health care, and parents’ work
outcomes for low-income families by offering cash incentives. Conditional cash transfers have
become popular and have been thought of as a useful tool to accomplish the goals of encouraging
investment in human capital and alleviating poverty.
A prerequisite for the policymaker when designing a conditional cash transfer program is to
determine the recipients of the incentive payments in the first place. If all people are qualified
to the conditional cash transfer program, people who do not need the incentive payments may
also receive the benefits, referred to as the inclusion error. However, if there is a pre-established
criterion for determining the qualification of receiving conditional cash transfers, people more in
need of the incentive payments may be excluded from the program, resulting in the exclusion
error. Thus, a well-designed conditional cash program should target beneficiaries who are the
neediest and deserving to receive the incentive payments in the population. The most widely
adopted selection method is based on geographic targeting and means testing. Conditional cash
transfer programs usually first target the population in areas with relatively low income compared
to other geographical regions and also account for the socioeconomic status.
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Conditional cash transfer programs may offer incentives to students ( parents), teachers, or
both students and teachers. Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011) examine the impacts of the
teacher incentive program that rewards teacher for improvement on student performance in stu-
dents’ test scores in rural India. Schools were randomly assigned as either one of the treatment
groups or the control group. They find that test scores in math and language tests increased by 0.27
and 0.17 standard deviations respectively for students in the schools where teachers were offered
incentives. Glewwe et al. (2003) also evaluate the effects of a randomized experiment that offered
fourth- through eighth-grade teachers in primary schools for student performance on districtwide
exams. Students in the treatment schools on average obtained 0.144 standard deviations higher test
scores in the second year than those in the control schools. Angrist and Lavy (2009), Kremer et
al. (2009), Fryer (2011), Barrow and Rouse (2013) study the effects of effects of monetary incen-
tive paid to students and find evidence that incentives positively affect students performance and
study behaviors. Behrman et al. (2015) examine the effects of three performance-based incentives
designs: incentives provided to students only, to teachers only, and to both students and teachers.
They find the most significant effects for groups in which students and teachers were both offered
incentives.
My study is based on the Youth Education Improvement Program (YEIP), a conditional cash
transfer program that provided students (and teachers) monetary incentives in Mabian Yi Au-
tonomous County, located in the Sichuan Province in China. In Mabian Yi Autonomous County,
47.51% of the residents are the Yi people, and many of the households do not take youth’s educa-
tion seriously due to various economic and geographic reasons. The rationale for utilizing condi-
tional cash transfers is that offering monetary incentives tied to multiple measures of performance
encourages parents and students, especially students who performed poorly, to invest in education
to improve academic achievement and encourage teachers to help with students. The ultimate goal
of the program is to increase human capital accumulation and thus prevent the inter-generational
transmission of poverty.
I estimate the impact of YEIP and show that the incentive demonstrated a positive effect on stu-
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dent performance in both standardized Chinese and mathematics examinations when the treatment
group did not differ from the control group in individual, household, and class characteristics. In
the sample, students are classified into four groups according to their performance in the previ-
ous baseline semester. Performance in the baseline semester is taken into account in estimation to
better measure the impact of the conditional cash transfer program on student performance. My
estimates further show the most significant average impact on student performance in both Chinese
and mathematics for students with a relatively low baseline grade when the control group and the
treatment do not differ from each other in characteristics.
The essay is organized as follows. Section 3.1 reviews some literature on conditional cash
transfers. In section 3.2, I introduce the YEIP (the sample design and implementation, the survey,
the examinations, and the incentives). The empirical results are presented in section 3.3. Section
3.4 concludes.
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2. THE COST OF RAISING CHILDREN
2.1 Literature Review
Among the related literature, Kornrich and Furstenberg (2013) examine how investments in
children vary across different periods using detailed expenditure data on clothing, child care and
education expenditures, and toys, hobbies, and playground equipment from the Consumer Expen-
diture Survey data (CES) by the United States Bureau Statistics. The main result thay find is that
between the early 1970s and late 2000s, families shifted from heavier investments in male chil-
dren to heavier investments in female children. Families additionally shifted from investing more
in children’s teen years to investing more when children are under age 6 and when in their mid-
20. These results illustrate changes in gender and age differences in the cost of raising children.
Lino et al. (2017) calculate expenditures on children in 2015 for the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) by using the CES. Excluding clothing, child care and education expenses,
the CES does not provide details on who incurred expenses and the purposes for the expenses.
Allocation rules computed from other sources are required to calculate the estimated expenses to
child-bearing. The 2015 USDA food plans based on food intake recommendations and cost of
food for various categories and quantities are used to compute the share of total household food
expenses for children. The share of household out-of-pocket health care expenses spent on chil-
dren obtained from the United States Department of Health and Human Services 2012 Medical
Expenditure Panel Survey is applied to calculate the health care expenses for children. The United
States Department of Transportation study estimates that 75% of household transportation ex-
penses is family-related, and the family-related expenses are allocated in equal proportions among
household members. Miscellaneous expenses are also allocated equally among family members.
Housing expenses on children are estimated from the average cost of an additional bedroom by first
regressing housing expenses on the number of bedrooms in a house. After the assignment is cal-
culated, the cost of raising children is estimated by regressing the expenditure on children on total
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income, family size, and the age of the younger children. Household demographic characteristics
are not considered in the calculation.
The current survey data available usually does not specify who receives what; thus, it is diffi-
cult to determine individual goods and services when computing expenditures on children directly.
In the absence of individual-level data and in the attempt to consider household economic behav-
ior between families of different compositions, an indirect method that utilizes the survey data to
compare the total expenditures of childless families and those of families with children who have
a comparable standard of living is introduced to estimate the cost of raising children. The method
that computes the extra expenditure required to maintain the standard of living of a family unaf-
fected by the presence of children also faces drawbacks. One challenge in estimation comes from
making households of different compositions comparable. Additionally, an increase in family size
as a consequence of the presence of children generates economies of scales in consumption and
thus changes the shadow prices and the shadow budgets for all family members.
Equivalence scale that measures the ratio of the costs of achieving the same level of the material
living standard under two different family compositions is commonly utilized in the literature to
estimate the cost of having children. The cost of raising children can be obtained by first, comput-
ing equivalence scale by taking the ratio of expenditures of households with and without children
that achieve the same living standard. The supplementary portion of total expenditure is considered
as the cost of having children. Engel (1895) is the earliest study that derives an equivalence scale,
using the share of total expenditure spent on food as the indicator of living standard. This implies
that two households enjoy the same level of the living standard if they consume an equal share of
total expenditure on food. This share declines as total household expenditure increases and usually
rises with household sizes. A decline in share is regarded as an increase in the standard of living,
and vice versa. Let s0 be the family size of the base family and x0 the total household expenditure,
another family of larger size s1 has a total expenditure of x1. The two families achieve the same
level of the living standard if they both consume (q/x1) of total expenditure on food. Thus, the
equivalence scale defined as the ratio of x1 and x0, i.e. x1/x0, gives the scalar by which total ex-
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penditure of the larger family s1 must be multiplied to achieve the same living standard as the base
family s0. This approach implicitly assumes that all goods consumed in a household are impacted
by the presence of the new child in the same way; that is, increments in all goods rise in the same
proportion as food expenditure does.
Rothbarth (1943) suggests using the expenditure level spent on goods exclusively consumed
by adults, such as adult clothing, tobacco, and alcohol, instead of the share of food consumption
as the measure of the living standard for different family compositions. The Rothbarth approach
focuses on children’s impact on the amount spent on goods exclusively consumed by adults, i.e.,
adult-specific goods. In contrast, the Engel approach focuses on effects on the total expenditure
share of jointly consumed goods of food. Under the Rothbarth approach, adults are assumed to
act in a selfish manner and thus wish to keep their consumption of adult-specific goods unchanged
to maintain the same living standard. If two families spend an equal amount on goods exclusively
consumed by adults, they attain the same living standard in terms of the level of adult consumption.
Assuming the base family, s0, has a total household expenditure of x0, and the larger family s1 has
a total expenditure of x1. The two families achieve the same living standard if they consume the
same amount of q on adult-specific goods. Thus, the ratio of total expenditures x1 and x0, i.e.,
x1/x0, with equal expenditure spent on adult-specific goods represents the equivalence scale that
enables the larger family, s1, achieves the same standard of living as the base family, s0, does.
Adult-specific goods are required to be separable from children’s consumption for estimating
the cost of raising children. Deaton et al. (1989) use the 1980-1981 household survey data in
Spain, the Spanish Encuestas de Presupuestos Familiares, to test the assumption that adult-specific
consumption is demographically separable from children for different categories of adult-specific
goods candidates and age group combinations. Demographic separability in this paper implies that
the presence of children aged 0-13 years old should induce no direct demand for adult-specific
goods. Overall, most of the adult-specific goods candidates in the paper are accepted as de-
mographically separable from the presence of children. Gronau (1991) tests the validity of the
separability assumption that the presence of children has the same impact on all adult goods. Us-
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ing the United States 1960 and 1972 CES data on adult-specific goods, including men’s clothing,
women’s clothing, tobacco, and alcoholic beverages, all successfully pass the test, individually and
combined. Surveys of the main approaches employed in the literature, including Engel, Rothbarth,
Prais and Houthakker, Barten, and Gorman, are shown in Browning (1992) and Nelson (1993).
Among all approaches, the Rothbarth approach is one of the most employed. Gronau (1988) also
verifies that if parents’ material living standard is used as a benchmark, the Rothbarth approach
is the only one available method that complies with the assumption and can be used to derive an
equivalence scale. Further, the existence of adult-specific goods are required to identify them.
The original Rothbarth approach does not account for the possibility of scale economies if
family size increases with the presence of children. Bargain and Donni (2012) follow the approach
used by Lewbel and Pendakur (2008) that incorporates economies of scale into the estimation of
parents’ and child’s shares of total expenditure with an extended collective model using the 2000
French Household Budget Survey data. Differing from traditional literature on collective mod-
els given by Lewbel and Pendakur (2008) and Browning et al. (2013) (where children are treated
as consuming together with their mother), in Bargain and Donni (2012), both parents and chil-
dren have preferences represented by indirect utility functions. Bargain and Donni include single
men, single women, childless couples, and couples with one child to identify the effect of scale
economies on each individual. They also identify the individual difference between a couple in
their responses to the presence of a first child. Men’s clothing and women’s clothing are used as
adult-specific goods for husband and wife respectively. They find that the expenditure made for
children is 23% of total expenditure of a family for a girl and 26.5% for a boy. However, the esti-
mated cost of children computed by their approach – the percentage of the household expenditure
of a childless couple must be compensated in order to maintain the level of utility of the parents
unaffected after the presence of the first child – is very small at around 5.3% of total expenditure
for a boy and about 0.4% for a girl due to the economies of scale. Dunbar et al. (2013) is an-
other paper that employs a collective model in which children also have their own utility. They
use the 2004-2005 second Malawi Integrated Household Survey data for their analysis. The esti-
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mation sample includes observations of couples with one to four children. Economies of scale in
expenditure is not estimated in this paper though. They find that families make a large share of
household expenditure on children, ranging from 13.5% to 29.3% of total expenditures for families
with one to four children. Although the share of total expenditure increases with the number of
children, the average share of total expenditure each child obtains decreases when the number of
children increases. Results show boys are favored over girls; a child’s share of total expenditure
falls by from 4.8% to 6.5% if all the children are girls. In this essay, detailed information on the
expenditure spent for adult clothing and other consumer products in conjunction with information
of household wealth from the 2011 Chinese Household Finance Survey make the identification of
resource shares, economies of scales, and equivalence scales possible.
2.2 The Model
In this section, the household behavioral models are specified. I follow the approach and iden-
tification assumptions proposed by Lewbel and Pendakur (2008) for childless couples and later
Bargain and Donni (2012) for couples with one child to estimate the equivalence scale, the cost of
raising one or two children, and the marginal cost of raising an additional child. There are three
types of families: childless couples, couples with one child, and couples with two children.
2.2.1 Household Resource Shares between Members and Members’ Budget Share Equa-
tions
The following sections describe models for a childless couple and a couple with one child. The
case of a couple with two children can be analyzed similarly. A couple and a child in a household
are denoted as m = a and k respectively.
2.2.1.1 A Childless Family
A childless family with a vector of individual characteristics za consumes a vector of private
or public goods ca = (c1a, . . . , c
Q
a ) and has a monotonically increasing, strictly quasi-concave, and
continuously twice differentiable direct utility function expressed by Ua(ca, za) that measures the
material standard of living. Given the log total expenditure constraint x and a vector of log prices
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p, the childless family solves the following utility maximization problem to determine the level of




subject to p′ca = x.




The indirect utility function that is three times differentiable and independent of the household
demographic structure corresponding to Ua can be defined by
Va(p, x, za) = U (c
∗
a(p, x, za); za) .
The budget share of a couple for good cqa at a price of p
q can be obtained using Roy’s identity
ωqa(p, x, za) = −
∂Va(p, x, za)/∂ log p
q
∂Va(p, x, za)/∂ log x
,
for q = 1, . . . , Q.
2.2.1.2 A Family with One Child
In a family consisting of a couple and a child, the family members m = a and k face the log
total expenditure constraint x and a vector of log prices p. The couple receives a share of total ex-
penditure represented by ηa, according to their bargaining power summarized by the differentiable
sharing function. The child receives a share of total expenditure denoted by ηk. Furthermore,
the increase in the number of household members as a result of the presence of a child creates
economies of scale. The cost savings enjoyed by the couple from economies of scale in consump-
tion because of the presence of a child is described by sa.
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To achieve the identification goal, assumptions are summarized as in Lewbel and Pendakur
(2008) and Bargain and Donni (2012).
Assumption 1. The sharing functions, ηm(p, za, zk) for m = a and k, are differentiable, indepen-
dent of the total household expenditure, comprised between zero and one, and summed up to one
for the sake of simplicity, i.e. ηa(p, za, zk) = 1 in families consisting of a childless couple and
ηk(p, za, zk) = 1− ηa(p, za, zk) in families consisting of a couple and a child.
Assumption 2. For a couple with a child, there exists a scalar-valued, differentiable function,
sa(p, z), such that the indifference curve of the couple satisfy the following condition:
Ua = Va(p, x+ log ηa(p, za, zk)− log sa(p, za), za),
for any level of log expenditure allocated to the couple, x+ log ηa(p, za, zk). A child is assumed to
always live with parents in a household, sk = 1.
The log total expenditure is allocated between the couple and the child in a family, and then
utility functions are maximized given a Lindahl (1919) type shadow price vector and the shadow




ηa(p, za, zk)Ua(ca; za) + (1− ηa(p, za, zk))Uk(ck; zk)
subject to log(p′ca) = x+ log ηa(p, za, zk)− log sa(p, za),
log(p′ck) = x+ log(1− ηa(p, za, zk)),
c = casa(p, za) + ck,
p′c = x,
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The solution to this weighted sum utility maximization problem is
ca(p, x, za, zk) = c
∗
a (p, x+ log ηa(p, za, zk)− log sa(p, za), za) ,
ck(p, x, za, zk) = c
∗
k (p, x+ log(1− ηa(p, za, zk), zk) ,
c(p, x, za, zk) = ca (p, x, za, zk)sa(p, za) + ck(p, x, za, zk) .
In a family consisting of a couple and a child, given resource shares, the fraction of resource
share spent on good cqm can be derived by applying Roy’s identity
ωqm(p, x, za, zk) = −
∂Vm(p, xm − log sm(p, zm), zm)/∂pq




for m = a, k and q = 1, . . . , Q. Developing the derivatives can lead to
ωqm(p, x, za, zk) = λm(p, zm) + ω
q
m(p, xm − log sm(p, zm), zm)
= λm(p, zm) + ω
q
m(p, x− log I(p, za, zk), zm),
where λm(p, zm) = ∂ ln sm(p, zm)/∂pq is the price elasticity of sm(p, z) with respect to the qth
product, which is equal to zero for a child since sm(p, zm) = 1 for a child living in a household.
The equivalence scale by which the total expenditure must be multiplied so that a couple with a
child can reach the same living standard as being a childless couple is




It becomes explicit that sa(p,m,) = ηa(p, za, zk) when all the consumption is purely public and
sa(p, zm) = 1 when all the goods are private.
The material cost of raising one child can be computed by
C1(p, za, zk) = µe(p, za, zk)− 1.
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The material cost of raising two children, C2(p, z), can be derived by a similar procedure.
2.3 Empirical Implementation
2.3.1 Identification Strategy
The goal in this intermediate stage is to identify the sharing and the scale economies functions
from the observations of childless couples, couples with one child, or couples with two children.
As long as the observations are observed when the vector of log prices contains very little or no
variation, the log price factor p can be taken out from equations. Given each member’s budget
share and the allocated level of log total household expenditure, the household budget share for
good q can be computed by






for q = 1, . . . , Q.
The critical identifying idea is that, after conditioning on observed demographic variables,
the difference in expenditure patterns between a childless couple and a couple with one child
are attributed entirely to joint consumption (economies of scale in consumption) and resource
allocation. Identification only requires the existence of an adult-specific good for the couple in a
household.
For a childless couple, the household budget share spent on good q is equal to the budget share
of the couple
W q0 (x, za) = ω
q
a(x, za),
for q = 1, . . . , Q.
For a couple with one child, the household budget share spent on adult-specific good qa is
W qa1 (x, za, zk) = ηa(za, zk) [λ
qa
a (za) + ω
qa
a (x− log Ia(za, zk), za)] ,
as the adult-specific good is consumed by only the couple. The function λqaa (za) can be discarded
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by having first-order derivative with respect to the log total expenditure x:
∇xW qa1 (x, za, zk) = ηa(za, zk)∇xωqaa (x− log Ia(za, zk), za),
Differentiating the above equation again. The second-order derivative with respect to total expen-
diture x is
∇xxW qa1 (x, za, zk) = ηa(za, zk)∇xxωqaa (x− log Ia(za, zk), za).
Taking the ratio of the above two equations:
∇xW qa1 (x, za, zk)
∇xxW qa1 (x, za, zk)
=
∇xωqaa (x− log Ia(za, zk), za)
∇xxωqaa (x− log Ia(za, zk), za)
= 4qaa (x− log Ia(za, zk), za).
The left-hand side and 4qaa (·, za) are known from the budget share of childless couples. Thus,
the equivalence scale, ηa(za, zk)/sa(za), can be uniquely identified provided that 4qaa (·) is not
periodic in its first argument. Then, sharing function, ηa(za, zk), can be identified from the first-
order derivative equation, and the scaling function, sa(za), can be obtained from the definition
of ηa(za, zk)/sa(za). Lastly, the identification of λa(za) follows from the household budget share
spent on the adult-specific good qa.
The sharing function and scaling function for couples with two children can be identified by
utilizing observations of childless couples and couples with two children.
2.3.2 Functional Form
The households considered in this study are childless couples and couples with one child or
two children. The model for estimation can be written as the following system of equations. The
budget share equation of member m = a and k for good q is






m (xm − zmτm) + ζqm (xm − zmτm)
2 ,
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m, τm, and ζ
q
m are parameters. For a couple, the
characteristics entering zmγqm for adults include husband’s or wife’s age and education, whichever
is greater, dummies for urban resident and total household income greater than household total
expenditure, and those entering zmτm include husband’s or wife’s age and education, whichever
is greater. For children, the characteristics entering both zmγqm and zmτm include age and gender
of the first child for families with one child and age of the first child and a dummy for a gender
combination of a female firstborn and male second-born for families with two children.
For a childless couple, the household budget share is just the budget share of the couple spent
on good q specified above plus an error term
W̃ q0 (x, z) = ω
q
a(x, za) + ε
q
0.
For a family with one child, the household budget share spent on good q is




a(x− log Ia(z), za)] + (1− ηa(z))ω
q
k(x+ log(1− ηa(z)), zk) + ε
q
1.




exp(β̄a + zaβa) + exp(β̄k + zkβk)
,
where β̄m and βm for m = a and k are parameters. The economies scaling function is
log sa(z) = ᾱa + zaα,




For a family with two children, the household budget share spent on good q is similar to the
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share of a fmaily with one child




a(x+ log Ia(z), za)] + (1− ηa(z))ω
q
k(x+ log(1− ηa(z)), zk) + ε
q
2,
where ηa(z) represents the budget share for a couple with two children.
Households in the data are indexed by n, and the numbers of childless families, families with
one child, and families with two children in the data are denoted by N0, N1, and N2, respectively.
Let Wc,n be the (K − 1) vector of observed budget shares for the first (K − 1) goods consumed by
household n with the number of children denoted by c, and Ŵc,n(θ) be the corresponding (K − 1)
vector of predicted budget shares for some parameter vector θ. The vector of residuals is given by
εc,n(θ) = Wc,n − Ŵc,n(θ). If ε̂c,n = εc,n(θ̂0), where θ̂0 is any initial consistent estimation for the















which gives a new value θ̂1 for the estimates. I then iterate with new estimates until the covariance
matrix to obtain the final estimates.
2.4 The Correction of Selection Bias
The number of children is usually the result of a family’s decision according to a family’s
preference. The expectation of the marginal cost of raising a second child can be computed by
taking the difference between the expected costs of raising two children and one child when the
fertility decision is determined without intervention outside the family. However, policy restriction
in China played an important role in determining the number of children in a family until the one-
child policy ended in 2016. Between 1978 and 2015, only couples who met the requirements set by
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the government could apply to have a second child without penalty. Couples who were not allowed
to have a second child could pay the penalty according to their own economic and social economic
status to have an additional child. Qualifying to have an additional child does not necessarily
imply a family would desire another child at the same time, there existed non-qualified families
who would be willing to pay the penalty to have a second child. The general stopping rule related
to son preference is that a family will continue to have an additional child until the ideal number
of male children is reached. In the case of China, a family is more likely to have a second child
when the first-born is a daughter because of the strong son preference. This is particularly true for
families with one daughter facing financial or other difficulties in rural areas. As a result, among
the two-child families, a relatively high proportion of those families have a firstborn daughter
and second born son. The gender imbalance is more significant in rural areas where social and
family economic status are lower. Moreover, in my sample, a large proportion of couples with two
children received less than 12 years of education (91.63%); and a large proportion lived in rural
China (60.00%). A potential selection bias issue exists when the cost of two children is estimated
since I only observe the cost of raising two children for a very restricted nonrandom group of
families who are more likely to have strong son preference, receive fewer years of schooling, and
live in poor rural areas.
The probability that couples in the sample of the two-child families is a function of 1) years of
education, 2) areas of residence due to the exceptions to the one-child policy for some particular
groups, and 3) preference for a son. The household total expenditure for a family strongly depends
on a couple’s years of schooling and geographic location. Estimating causal effects will be a
problem if selection on observables (education and residence area) exists. In particular, certain
values of total household expenditure are over-represented due to their relationship with education
and areas of residence permit. Horvitz and Thompson (1952) is a very early paper that presents a,
now frequently used, inverse probability weighting scheme that accounts for different proportions
of observations within a strata of a population. When the sampling probability is known (derived
from the sampling population of a population), the inverse of this probability is used to weight the
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observations. I adopt the inverse probability weighting method to correct the sample selection bias
that results from over-representation of certain types of families. While 51.60% of the couples
with one child obtained more than 12 years of schooling and lived in urban areas, only 7.44%
of the couples with two children achieved more than 12 years of schooling and lived in urban
areas. 28.72% and 32.56% of the one-child and two-child couples respectively received less than
12 years of schooling and lived in urban areas. 3.35% and 0.93% of one-child and two-child
couples respectively received more than 12 years of education and lived in rural areas. Finally,
while only 16.33% of the couples with one child received less than 12 years of schooling and lived
in rural areas, 59.07% of the couples with two children received less than 12 years of schooling
and lived in rural areas. Thus, if I reweight the impact that lower-educated rural couples and well-
educated urban couples have in the estimation of the cost of raising two children, I would alter
the distribution of types in the two-child family sample to match the distribution of types in the
one-child family sample. Inverse probability weighting method weights each family’s impact by
the inverse of the probability that the family appears in the two-child family sample.
Before I can correct the selection bias that accrues due to the exception of some particular
groups of the one-child policy, the probability of appearing in the two-child family sample has to
be estimated first. This is accomplished by fitting a Probit regression of appearing in the two-child
family sample given the standard normal distribution assumption on the error terms. Let k2 be the
indicator of whether a couple has a second child, 1{•} be an indicator function, and εk2 follows a
normal distribution. With s represents the segment for the combination of dummies for years of
education greater than 12 years and urban residence permit. The probability that a couple have a
second child can be obtained by fitting the following Probit regression
k2 = 1{s+ εk2o}.
The inverse probability needed to match the distribution of the two-child family sample to the
distribution of the one-child family sample is the inverse of the fitted probability obtained above.
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To understand the problem of sample selection bias on unobservables, for example gender
preference, a set of two equations of interest are involved. The first equation is the choice between
having a second child or not. Let k2 be indicators of whether a couple has the second child or not.
With a set of exogenous variables z and an indicator function 1{•}, a family chooses to have the
second child if the net value of having the second child, zβ − εk2u is greater than 0. The second
equation expresses the household budget share spent on good q for a family with two children. The
two equations are written as follows







a(x− log Ia(z), za)]
+(1− ηa(z))ωqk(x+ log(1− ηa(z)), zk) + ε
q
2 if k2 = 1
− otherwise.
(Heckman, 1979) sets the correlation between the independent variable and the error term as an
omitted variable in the ordinary least square moment condition. That is,
E(W̃ q2,n|x, z, k2 = 1) =ηa(z)[λqa(z) + ωqa(x− log Ia(z), za)]
+ (1− ηa(z))ωqk(x+ log(1− ηa(z)), zk) + E(ε
q
2|x, z, k2 = 1).
Furthermore, using the conditional density of the standard normal distributed εq2,




which is called the inverse Mills ratio, where φ and Φ are the probability and cumulative density
functions of the standard normal distribution. As a result, the moment condition that holds in the
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sample is
E(W̃ q2,n|x, z, k2 = 1) =ηa(z)[λqa(z) + ωqa(x− log Ia(z), za)]




where δ = σ12 6= 0 as error terms are correlated.
2.5 Data and Empirical Results
2.5.1 Data and Sample
The data comes from the China Household Finance Survey (CHFS), conducted in 2011. The
survey was designed by the Survey and Research Center for China Household Finance at South-
western University of Finance and Economics and includes 8,438 households. Households were
asked to recall their expenditures in each category in the previous month or previous year. In the
estimation of budget share equations, Q = 10 commodities are included: adult clothing, food at
home, food out, household operation, leisure, transportation, housing, education, other categories,
and children’s clothing (the omitted good in the system). The selection criterion for households in-
cluded in the sample is described below. Only nucleus families without a child and with one child
or two children aged less than 18 years old in which both husband and wife are working adults
aged 20-59 are included. The final sample consists of 307 childless households, 686 one-child
households, and 215 households with two children, that is, 1,208 households in total.
Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 summarize the final sample. The descriptive statistics tables provide an
overview of the issues that have to be addressed. Due to the exemption in the one-child policy that
allowed rural households with financial difficulties to have a second child if their firstborn was a
girl and the prevailing strong son preference, 64% of the firstborns of the two-child households are
daughters. This provides clear evidence that families with a firstborn daughter were more likely to
be allowed and were more willing to have another child. Families that valued boys over girls were
more likely to practice diagnostic ultrasound for sex determination and abortion of girls if their
ideal number of male children had not reached despite doctors being forbidden from exposing
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the gender of unborn babies. As further evidence of the strong preference for sons, 61% of the
second-born children in the two-child families are male. Among the two-child families, 42% of
the families has a firstborn daughter and a second-born son, 42% has two children of the same
gender, and only 16% has a firstborn son and a second-born daughter. Couples with two children
on average received fewer years of schooling and earned a lower income. In addition, a large
proportion of two-child families live in the middle (40%), western (28%), or rural region of China
where sex ratios are relatively higher and circumstances are different from those in east China.
Family economic behavior is affected by family size, parental education, and living location. Thus,
estimating the cost of two children by using a subset of families that were allowed to have two
children can produce distorted results.
The average share of household expenditure spent on adult clothing decreases as the household
size increases due to the presence of children. This result is especially presented when a family
goes from having one child to having two children. Families with one child and childless fami-
lies spent the smallest and the largest fraction of total expenditure respectively on food at home.
Families with two children and those with one child spent the smallest and the largest proportion
on dining out respectively. The share of household expenditure spent on household operation de-
creased as the family size increased. Families with two children were those spent the smallest
share of household expenditure on the leisure-related category. Families with one child spent the
largest share of household expenditure on leisure. One-child families on average spent the largest
proportion of expenditure on transportation but spent the smallest proportion on housing. Families
with two children on average invested a relatively larger proportion than families with one child in
the education-related category, albeit the difference was small. The average share of house expen-
diture spent on children clothing increases as the number of children increases, the increment was
not big though.
2.5.2 Empirical Results
The coefficients related to the sharing and scaling equations are reported in Table 2.3. The
first result is that the older a couple is, the greater the magnitude of scale economies enjoyed by
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample
All Childless One Child Two Children
Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Husband age 40.25 8.18 46.07 11.45 38.21 5.62 38.42 4.87
Wife age 38.53 8.20 44.60 11.63 36.31 5.41 36.92 4.55
Husband eudcation 11.17 3.99 10.28 4.33 12.35 3.68 8.68 2.74
Wife eudcation 10.28 4.63 8.64 5.51 11.83 3.96 7.67 2.98
Urban 0.66 0.47 0.51 0.50 0.80 0.40 0.40 0.49
Provincial level city 0.15 0.36 0.17 0.38 0.18 0.39 0.03 0.17
East 0.50 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.33 0.47
Middle 0.27 0.44 0.25 0.43 0.23 0.42 0.40 0.49
West 0.24 0.43 0.22 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.28 0.45
Houseowner 0.92 0.27 0.91 0.29 0.92 0.27 0.94 0.24
Carowner 0.20 0.40 0.10 0.31 0.27 0.44 0.12 0.33
Government employee 0.29 0.45 0.22 0.41 0.40 0.49 0.05 0.22
Log income 10.51 1.09 10.20 1.21 10.80 0.96 10.03 1.00
Log expenditure 10.43 0.95 9.90 1.10 10.73 0.78 10.26 0.85
Income ≥ expenditure 0.66 0.47 0.68 0.47 0.69 0.46 0.53 0.50
1st kid 0.75 0.44 . . 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
2nd kid 0.18 0.38 . . . . 1.00 0.00
1st kid gender (1=boy) 0.54 0.50 . . 0.59 0.49 0.36 0.48
2nd kid gender (1=boy) 0.61 0.49 . . . . 0.61 0.49
1st kid age 10.58 4.91 . . 9.82 5.03 13.01 3.56
2nd kid age 7.05 3.81 . . . . 7.05 3.81
1st daughter & 2nd son 0.42 0.50 . . . . 0.42 0.50
Births spacing 5.96 3.29 . . . . 5.96 3.29
Area kids sex ratio 118.61 6.51 119.03 6.82 117.53 6.04 121.46 6.61
Sample size 1,028 307 686 215
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Table 2.2: Budget Shares
All Childless One Child Two Children
Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Adult clothing 0.057 0.056 0.064 0.073 0.059 0.051 0.037 0.037
Food home 0.288 0.184 0.319 0.216 0.271 0.164 0.299 0.188
Food out 0.064 0.088 0.053 0.090 0.075 0.086 0.048 0.087
Household operation 0.151 0.100 0.173 0.176 0.143 0.079 0.141 0.101
Leisure 0.042 0.062 0.045 0.044 0.048 0.063 0.022 0.032
Transportation 0.083 0.142 0.057 0.096 0.095 0.157 0.079 0.142
Housing 0.083 0.171 0.110 0.203 0.065 0.143 0.106 0.197
Education 0.066 0.098 0.012 0.057 0.080 0.103 0.094 0.101
Others 0.148 0.155 0.164 0.174 0.142 0.143 0.146 0.161
Children clothing 0.015 0.018 . . 0.019 0.017 0.023 0.021
Sample size 1,208 307 686 215
a couple. This is especially true for a couple living with two children. Regarding the distribution
of resources between a couple and their child/children, the couple’s maximum level of education
has a positive effect on their own share of household resource in a one-child family, but a negative
impact on a two-child family. Taking into account economies scale, the cost of raising a child
declines with a couple’s maximum level of education while the cost of raising two children rises
with a couple’s maximum level of education. Living in urban decreases the share of household
resources and the magnitude of scale economies that a couple receives in a two-child household.
The children’s share of household resources is negatively correlated with the age of the first child
in a two-child family. Once the first child attends school, the share of total expenditure devoted to
the first child decreases due to the nearly free, compulsory 9-year education in China. In contrast
to Bargain and Donni (2012) and Dunbar et al. (2013), gender differences are not shown in the
one-child family. Nonetheless, a child’s share of household resources significantly increases when
a two-child family has a female firstborn and a male second-born.
The estimated shares of household resources and cost of raising children for the representative
couple (aged 38 or younger with no more than 12 years of schooling and living in urban areas)
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Table 2.3: Parameter Estimates of Sharing and Scaling Equations
One Child Two Children
Estimate S.D. Estimate S.D.
Translations of total expenditure (sa):
Constant -0.0036 0.0037 -0.0130 0.0018
Max age -0.0068 0.0052 -0.0160 0.0100
Max education 0.0048 0.0090 0.0150 0.0184
Group (Income geq Expenditure) -0.0250 0.0134 0.0165 0.0193
Urban 0.0460 0.0324 0.0246 0.0158
Shares of total expenditure (ηn):
Variables entering couple’s exponential function:
Max age 0.0028 0.0071 0.0065 0.0125
Max education 0.0403 0.0099 -0.0953 0.0498
Group (Income geq Expenditure) 0.0356 0.0382 -0.0045 0.0232
Urban -0.0754 0.0634 -0.0241 0.0184
Variables entering children’s exponential function:
Constant -0.0072 0.0026 0.0200 0.0036
1st kid age 0.0101 0.0100 -0.1345 0.0409
1st kid gender (1=boy) / 1st daughter & 2nd son -0.0169 0.0123 0.1875 0.0625
Note. –
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
are shown in Table 2.4 and Figure 2.1. The shares of total expenditure devoted to a child are
32.65% for a boy and 32.81% for a girl in the one-child households; the costs of raising one child
are 9.71% for a boy and 9.96% for a girl. A couple with a female firstborn and a male second-
born allocates a larger share of household resources to children than a couple with other gender
combinations of two children (especially one with two children of the same gender), and they are
50.01% and 42.02% respectively. The costs of raising children are 43.36% for a couple with a
female firstborn and a male second-born and 19.70% for one with other gender combinations of
two children (especially one with two children of the same sex). Furthermore, the marginal cost
of raising a second-born is 9.99% if a family already has a firstborn boy. This is very close to
the marginal cost of having a second-born girl if the couple already has a firstborn daughter. The
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Figure 2.1: (A) Distribution of Household Resources; (B) Marginal Share of Household Resources
Devoted to an Additional Child; (C) Cost of Raising Children; (D) Marginal Cost of Raising an
Additional Child for the urban representative couple
interesting result here is that the marginal cost of raising an additional child jumps to 33.40% when
the couple already has a girl followed by having a boy. The marginal cost of raising an additional
child is very similar to the cost of raising the first child except for the case in which a couple has
already had a firstborn girl and subsequently has a second-born boy. The difference in the marginal
costs of raising an additional child provides clear evidence for the conjecture that sons are preferred
to daughters.
Turning to the rural area, the results in Table 2.5 and Figure 2.2 show that the representative
couple (aged 38 or younger with no more than 12 years of schooling) spend 33.70% and 33.57%
of household resources on a male child and a female child respectively. The costs of raising a child












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.2: (A) Distribution of Household Resources; (B) Marginal Share of Household Resources
Devoted to an Additional Child; (C) Cost of Raising Children; (D) Marginal Cost of Raising an
Additional Child for the rural representative couple
second-born allocates a large share of resources to their children than the couple with two children
of the same sex, and they are 39.79% and 32.94%. The costs of raising children are 8.92% for a
couple with a female firstborn and a male second-born and -3.20% for raising two children with
the same gender.
I further compare the differences in the total costs and marginal costs between urban and rural
representative couple in Figure 2.3. The results in this essay show the marginal cost of raising an
additional child is much lower for the couple living in a rural area than the urban counterpart.
As mentioned above, a couple’s maximum level of education is an important factor that affects
the distribution of household resources and alters the cost of raising children. Table 2.6, Table 2.7,
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of raising children for the representative couple. The results show a couple receives more than 9
years of schooling, spend smaller shares of household resources on the an only child (29.40% for a
boy and 29.38% for a girl) than a couple that receives less 9 years of schooling (34.01% for a boy
and 34.72% for a girl). The cost of raising one child is lower for the couple that receives more than
9 years of schooling (2.25% for a boy and 2.26% for a girl) than for the couple receives less than
9 years of schooling (12.73% for a boy and 14.45% for a girl). For the couple with two children,
higher education level implies larger shares of household resources distributed to the children.
Couples with more than nine years of schooling spend on average 53.56% on a composition of a
female firstborn and a male second-born versus 43.57% for two children with the same gender. The
costs of raising two children for these composition are 49.64% and 24.32% respectively. Couples
with less than nine years of schooling on average spend 41.74% on a female firstborn and a male
second-born and 35.30% on two children with the same sex; the costs of raising two children are
23.45% and -0.34% respectively. The shares of household resources and costs of raising children
for a lower-educated couple versus a well-educated couple are compared and contrasted in Figure
2.6. The results show it costs the lower-educated couple more than the higher-educated couple to
raise a child. In addition, the well-educated couple tends to have a higher marginal cost of raising
an additional child than the lower-educated counterpart.
2.6 Conclusion
Departing from Bargain and Donni (2012) and Dunbar et al. (2013), the results in this essay
suggest that families spent similar shares of total expenditure on a male and female child if couples
had only one child. Moreover, the costs of raising a boy and a girl after considering economies
of scale were not different from each other. Despite these results, the marginal cost of raising an
additional child was much higher for families with a firstborn daughter and a second-born son than
those with two children of the same gender. Additionally, to raise an additional child the marginal
cost was higher for urban couples than rural couples, and it was also higher for couples with more
years of schooling than for those with less education.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.4: (A) Distribution of Household Resources; (B) Marginal Share of Household Resources
Devoted to an Additional Child; (C) Cost of Raising Children; (D) Marginal Cost of Raising an
Additional Child for the urban lower-educated representative couple
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Figure 2.5: (A) Distribution of Household Resources; (B) Marginal Share of Household Resources
Devoted to an Additional Child; (C) Cost of Raising Children; (D) Marginal Cost of Raising an

















































































































adopt pronatalist policies in order to provide households with children special benefits. Some of
these countries include Canada, France, Germany, Israel, Sweden, and the United States. Many
of these policies are designed to increase fertility by providing financial incentives that reduce the
cost of raising children. Whittington et al. (1990) find elasticities of fertility with respect to the cost
of raising a child other than the eldest one ranges from 0.91 to 4.12, using the personal exemption
records from 1913 to 1984 in the United States. Milligan (2005) obtains a strong, positive, and
robust effect of the Allowance for Newborn Children policy that was implemented between 1988
and 1997 on fertility in Canada. The estimated elasticity of fertility with respect to the cost of
raising an additional child was estimated to be 4.09. This result translates to imply a 1% decrease in
cost of raising an additional child increased the total fertility rate by 4.09 births per 1,000 women.
Cohen et al. (2013) find that a 1% increase in the child subsidy leads to an increase of 4.96 in
total fertility rate, using Israel’s child subsidy records from 1999 to 2005. The literature suggests
that policies that change the cost of raising an additional child may be an effective government
policy instrument to influence the total fertility rate. My estimates provide a useful reference for
designing the appropriate policy instruments to alter fertility decisions.
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3. CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS AND STUDENT ACHIEVEMENTS: RESULTS
FROM A SOCIAL EXPERIMENT IN CHINESE PRIMARY SCHOOLS
3.1 Literature Review
In this section, I review some of the literature on conditional cash transfers. Angrist and Lavy
(2009) examine the impact of a monetary incentive program in Israel that offered high school
students in low-achieving schools cash incentives for passing a series of national examinations
in the core and elective subjects in every grade between tenth and twelfth. Forty nonvocational
high schools with a certain range of the 1999 Bagrut passing rates were selected and randomly
assigned to be either treatment group or the control group. The program increased Bagrut passing
rates particularly for girls with a predicted marginal passing rate. The increase in the passing rates
translated into an increase in postsecondary enrollment. Kremer et al. (2009) study the effects of
a merit-based scholarship program for sixth-grade girls in Kenya. The program provided a grant
for school fees (paid to school) and a grant for school supplies (paid to families) for two academic
years. The monetary incentives were offered to girls who scored well on academic examinations.
Schools were randomly assigned to treatment and control groups. The authors find evidence that
the incentives increased test scores for girls and surprisingly raised scores for non-targeted boys.
In addition, the largest improvements were observed in the second baseline test quartile, a group
thought to have relatively low probabilities of winning an award.
Fryer (2011) evaluates the effects of various incentive programs on student achievement in
three cities, Chicago, Dallas, and New York City. In Dallas, second-grade students were encour-
aged to read books and rewarded for passing a short quiz on them. In Chicago, students are paid
for grades received in five courses. In New York City, fourth- and seventh-grade students were
rewarded for performance in 10 standardized tests. Fryer finds no impact of financial incentives on
student achievement in Chicago and New York City, but possibly positive effects of investment on
English-speaking student achievement in Dallas. He concludes that incentives tied to inputs might
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be more appropriate for students in these schools. Barrow and Rouse (2013) study the effects of
performance-based scholarship programs on student behavior. The programs were offered to dif-
ferent target groups, students in their last year of high school and postsecondary students, with
lengths varying from one to four semesters. They find that students who qualified for incentives
devoted more time to educational activities and less time to non-educational activities such as work
and leisure.
Behrman et al. (2015) examine the effects of three performance-based incentives designs: in-
centives provided to students only, to teachers only, and to both students and teachers. Eighty-
eight Mexican high schools were randomly assigned to three different treatment groups and a
control group. They observe the most substantial treatment effects for groups in which both stu-
dents and teachers were offered incentives. Levitt et al. (2016) test the impact of a randomized
field experiment that provided various monthly performance-based incentives. Ninth-graders from
two schools in an academically low-performing school district or their parents received monetary
rewards for student educational achievement. A 2 × 2 design was used with the first type of treat-
ment being provided to either the student or parent and the other type being a fixed rate or a lottery,
yielding four treatment groups. In the student treatment group, students received the monetary
incentives while in the parent group, parents received the incentives. In the fixed rate treatment
group, students who met the monthly achievement standard for attendance, behavior, grades, and
test scores qualified for a $50 reward. In the lottery treatment group, students who met the monthly
achievement standard qualified for a lottery in which there was a 10% probability of winning an
award of $500. While they find a modest overall effect, a large and significant effect was observed
for students on the threshold of meeting the achievement standard.
There is a debate as to whether extrinsic incentives induce an adverse effect on intrinsic moti-
vation. Proponents of using incentives in behavioral interventions believe that monetary incentives
are effective in encouraging people to invest more effort to achieve the desired outcome; however,
opponents argue that, in the longer-term, extrinsic incentives may crowd out intrinsic motivations
that originally result in desired consequences. The argument is that salient extrinsic incentives
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may produce the desired consequence in the short-term, and intrinsic motivations can be weak-
ened as people may pursue the desired outcome less eagerly and thus lower effort on pursuing the
achievement (Gneezy et al., 2011). Bettinger (2012) evaluates the impact of a pay-for-performance
program on standardized tests, including mathematics, reading, social science, and science, admin-
istered to 3rd to 6th grade students in Coshocton, Ohio. Bettinger shows that the program had a
positive effect on students’ mathematics scores but did not significantly affect the scores of students
in other subjects. He additionally finds that the impact on mathematics score was most significant
for students who already performed well previously. Moreover, when examining the test scores a
year after the incentives were provided, he does not observe a difference in the scores between the
control and treatment group. Hence, the removal of the extrinsic incentives reduced the intrinsic
motivation.
Visaria et al. (2016) study the effects of a monetary reward for attending a required number of
school days on attendance rates and test scores in mathematics and science for third-grade students.
They find that the incentive for attending school increased attendance rates but did not affect scores
significantly. Two or three months after the incentive was discontinued, students with high baseline
attendance had similar attendance and test scores regardless if they were previously in the control
or treatment groups. For students with low baseline attendance, attendance and test scores were
decreased 2-3 months after the removal of the incentive. List et al. (2018) evaluate the effect of
monetary incentives on test performance for students in grades K-8 in the short- and long-run. For
the high-stakes non-incentivized test, students and tutors worked together in preparation. A week
later, a separate, incentivized test that measured similar knowledge and skills as the high-stakes test
was administered. The incentives were provided to either students, parents, tutors, students and
parents, or all three of them. They find that the financial incentives demonstrated a positive impact
on the incentivized test no matter who received the incentives. Effects for the non-incentivized test
were not observed immediately but were found after one year.
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3.2 The YEIP
Mabian Yi Autonomous County, under the administration of Leshan city, is a relatively poor
county located in southwest China’s Sichuan Province. The population of Mabian Yi Autonomous
county was 215,499 as of 2015 and has a total area of 2,304 square kilometers. Of the total area,
a large area consists of mountains and rivers, and 87.3% consists of mountains with elevations
higher than 1,000 meters. In 2015, GDP per capita was US$2,390 (14,888 CNY) in Mabian Yi
Autonomous County whereas the province and national average were US$5,937 (36,981 CNY)
and US$11,063 (68,905 CNY) respectively.1 In addition, the disposable personal income was
US$1,380 (8,595 CNY). With a poverty rate of 12.6%, it has been one of the 585 key counties in
the development-oriented poverty reduction program for many years.
In Mabian Yi Autonomous County, 47.51% of the residents are the Yi people, and the ratio is
even higher in some remote rural areas. Many of the Yi households do not value youth’s education
seriously as many families live far away from schools and expect children to help with farm chores
and housework as much as possible. Furthermore, if the Ministry of Education did not implement
the nine-year compulsory education, some parents would not plan to have their children attend
secondary school after graduating from primary school. According to the survey conducted at the
beginning of the fall 2015 semester, 20% of the students commuted more than one hour, one way
to school. After school, students spent on average more than two hours on farm chores and house-
work. These conditions provided an environment to produce low-performing schools and students,
and there is much room for the average scores of the countywide standardized examinations to be
improved.
Table 3.1 presents the performance distribution of the countywide standardized test in Chinese
and mathematics in the pre-treatment semesters (spring 2015 and spring 2016) for students in the
sample. In the spring 2015 semester, the average grade of the countywide standardized test in
Chinese was 57.95 out of 100 for the sixth-grade students in the sample, with only about 54.37%
1Data on the GDP for the year 2015 come from the Annual Report on Economics and Social Development of
Mabian Yi Autonomous county and the National Bureau of Statistics of China.
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of the students scoring higher than a passing score, 60. Mathematics performance was even lower
with an average of 46.82, and there was only 38.29% of the students scoring higher than 60.
Moreover, only 33.73% of the students scored higher than 60 in both subjects. In the spring
2016 semester, the third-grade students in the sample scored on average a 52.85 in Chinese, and
only 47.67% of the students scored higher than 60. The average mathematics score was 57.16
for the same third-grade students, and 52.48% of them received a score higher than 60. Roughly
38.78% of the students scored higher than 60 in both subjects. For the fourth-grade students, the
average Chinese score was 57.62 while 55.85% of the students scored higher than 60. The average
mathematics score was 62.08, and 61.17 % of the fourth-graders obtained a score higher 60. 48.4%
of the students scored higher than 60 in both subjects.
The importance of primary and middle schools is usually ignored as people usually lack in-
formation on the returns to primary and lower secondary education and irrationally discount the
future benefits of obtaining it. With the relatively low level of GDP per capita in the county and the
poor academic performance of the students across most of the school districts, appropriate mon-
etary incentives tied to school performance is a useful tool that could be used to improve student
outcomes. Additionally, a well-designed incentive program could be as an instrument to positive
change both student and parent attitudes and behaviors toward educational activities. The ratio-
nale for utilizing conditional cash transfers is that by offering monetary incentives tied to multiple
measures of performance, parents and students could invest more time and effort in educational
services. The investment could in-turn improve student academic achievement, increase human
capital accumulation, and decrease the possibility of inter-generational transmission of poverty.
In addition, it is expected to be an ideal place to evaluate the impact of an incentive program on
students’ academic achievement.
3.2.1 Sample Design and Implementation
The YEIP was launched by the Research Center of China Household Finance Survey at South-
western University of Finance and Economics in the fall 2015 semester. The program aimed at




































































































































































































































































































































and overcoming poverty through the accumulation of human capital in the long-run. In the fall
2015 semester, randomization was performed using a class-school-based randomization design
where all students in a class were in the same group. There were a total of 28 schools with 81
sixth-grade classes and 3,323 sixth-grade students in Mabian Yi Autonomous County in the 2015-
2016 academic year. The 28 schools were first sorted by the average school score. Nine schools
were picked up using probability proportional to size sampling method where schools across var-
ious performance could be included in the incentive program. Nine classes from the nine schools
were randomly selected to be in the treatment group and were offered conditional cash transfers.
Control classes were randomly selected from the nine schools and received no incentive. Classes
were assigned to the control or treatment groups by the YEIP; they were not given a choice of
being treated or not being treated.
In addition, another four classes were randomly chosen from four of the nine selected schools.
In these four classes, students and teachers were both offered incentive payments in return for
achieving multiple measures of performance. Given the truth that most of conditional cash transfer
programs offer monetary incentives to only students or to teachers, the additional treatment group
of both students and teachers receiving benefits could allow me to estimate the difference in the
effects of the incentives between different experimental designs. Specifically, I could be able to
measure the effectiveness of three alternative incentive schemes if the experiment was implemented
consistently and steadily. However, this scheme was terminated soon after the conditional cash
transfer program was implemented in Mabian Yi Autonomous County in 2015 due to teachers,
whom were not offered any monetary incentives, discovering the program and issuing complaints
about not being treated and receiving incentive payments. Therefore, I analyze only the effect of
the treatment that applied only to students.
In the fall 2016 semester, the incentive program was repeated in the same county. There were
116 fourth- and 85 fifth-grade classes with 3,892 and 3,852 students from the 28 schools. The
schools from the previous year and an additional five schools were selected. Most of the selected
schools were randomly allocated to either control or treatment groups; however, three of them
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consisted of both treatment and control groups. Among the 14 selected schools, nine schools had
only control classes, two schools had only treatment classes, and three schools had both control
and treatment groups. In the control schools, all fourth- and fifth-grade classes were assigned
as control classes. All fourth- and fifth-grade classes were assigned as treatment classes in the
treatment schools. In the schools with both the control and treatment groups, half of all the classes
were assigned as control classes, and the other half were assigned as treatment classes.
3.2.2 Surveys
Surveys were first conducted to collect information on the individual, household, teacher, and
class characteristics before treatment occurred each semester. Students were asked to answer ques-
tions regarding demographics, such as gender, ethnicity, and their study behavior. Moreover, ques-
tions designed to measure a student’s intelligence quotient and emotional quotient were included
at the end of the questionnaire to better understand students’ academic ability, the capability of
recognizing and adjusting their own emotions, and how they react to those of others. Students’
families were also interviewed to collect information on household characteristics. Among the
many variables from the household questionnaire, I utilize the parental education and household
expenditure on the educationally related category. The data from the teacher and the school sur-
veys include homework completion rates, teacher’s time management, and student performance in
the standardized examinations.
Part of the schools was not interviewed for individual and household surveys. Table 3.2 pro-
vides an insight into the sample attrition. Seven sixth-grade control classes and seven sixth-grade
treatment classes from the seven schools in the fall 2015 semester were included in the sample
for program analysis. In total, there were 241 sixth-grade students in the control group and 263
sixth-grade students in the treatment group. In 2016, 12 fourth-grade classes from the nine con-
trol schools and three fourth-grade classes from the two treatment schools were interviewed. In
addition, one control class and five treatment classes from the schools with both control and treat-
ment groups were interviewed. For the fifth-grade, the YEIP interviewed 12 classes from the nine
control schools and three classes for the treatment schools. Two control classes and five treatment
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classes from the schools with control and treatment groups were also interviewed. In 2016, 451
fourth-grade students and 466 fifth-grade students were included in the control group; and 235
fourth-grade students and 286 fifth-grade students were included in the treatment group.
3.2.3 Countywide Standardized Examinations
At the end of each semester, including the fall and spring semesters, the County Office of
Education administers the countywide standardized examinations on Chinese and mathematics
to students in each grade. The purpose of giving examinations at the end of each semester is
to assess whether students have learned what they were expected to learn or and to what degree
they have learned the material. Scores on examinations are not used as a requirement to transit
from one grade to the next or from primary school to secondary school. The incentives were
provided based on the performance of the examinations at the end of the fall semesters in 2015.
In addition, performances on the countywide standardized Chinese and mathematics examinations
administered in each primary school at the end of the pre-treatment semester were taken as the
baseline grade to understand the effects of the incentives better. Examination data for individual
students on the countywide standardized final exams were obtained from each school. Examination
scores were normalized such that scores in the control group have a mean of 0 and a standard
deviation of 1 within each grade in each semester.
3.2.4 Randomization Evidence
Table 3.3 presents the quality of the randomization by comparing the treatment and control
classes based on pre-treatment characteristics and performance. The first category in part (A)
shows student related characteristics, the proportion of Han Chinese, proportion of boys, mean
intelligence quotient, and mean emotional quotient. For students in the fall 2015 and fall 2016
semester in the sample, all variables of the treatment group in this category did not differ from
those of the control group at conventional levels of statistical significance. These results indicate
that students from control and treatment groups did not differ in average individual characteristics.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































and mothers with high school diploma and household educational expenditure. Parental education
of treatment group did not depart from that of the control group at conventional levels of statistical
significance for the fall 2015 sample. The average educational expenditure for the treatment and
control groups were not different from each other at conventional levels of statistical significance
for the fall 2015 sample either. These indicate that students in the control and treatment groups
tended to come from families where parents have similar years of educational attainment and were
willing to spend a similar amount on educational activities. Conversely, parental education of
the treatment group departed from that of the control group at the 0.05 significance level for the
students form the 2016 fall semester. The average educational expenditures for the treatment and
control groups were different from each other at a 0.01 significance level for the students in the
2016 fall semester. The differences in the household features between the treatment and the control
groups in the fall 2016 semester indicate that students in the treatment group tended to come from
families where parents had significantly more years of educational attainment and were willing to
spend more on educational activities. The last category provides a quick overview of some critical
variables obtained from the homeroom teacher’s response in the survey. All the variables of the
treatment group on the class level did not differ from those of the control group at conventional
levels of statistical significance for the fall 2015 sample. For the fall 2016 semester, the homework
completion rate of the control group was lower than that of the treatment group. All other variables
of the treatment group were not different from those of the control group at conventional levels of
statistical significance.
Part (D) compares control and treatment groups on the basis of the average normalized scores
on Chinese and mathematics in the baseline semester. The average scores in Chinese in the base-
line semester did not differ between the control and treatment groups at conventional levels of
significance (-0.10 versus -0.10 with p-value 0.99). Similarly, the average mathematics score of
the treatment group in the baseline did not depart from that of the control group at conventional
levels of significance (-0.09 versus -0.17 with p-value 0.85). In contrast, the Chinese score for the









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































that in the control group (-0.10 versus 0.34 with p-value 0.06). The average score in mathematics
for the fourth- and fifth-grade students in the treatment group in the fall 2016 semester was higher
than that in the control group (-0.10 versus 0.33 with p-value 0.07).
3.2.5 The Incentive Program
Merit-based scholarships have been frequently criticized for the possible adverse equity effects
that relatively advantaged students are the primary beneficiaries of these types of awards. The
YEIP was a pilot experiment designed to improve youth’s academic achievement extensively in
neediest areas through various cash transfer channels within the program and thus accumulate hu-
man capital on the condition that pre-specified requirements were met. There were three different
channels provided in the conditional cash transfer program. The first award offered cash incentives
to students who achieved distinguished performance on examinations in Chinese and mathematics.
Students were rewarded according to the rank in their classes. The higher the position, the larger
the award amount. The second award rewarded students for examination progress. Students who
received the top 10% of improvement were rewarded for their efforts. The third award offered
incentive payments for outstanding homework achievement. The last two awards targeted students
with relatively poor performance on examinations, who had a small probability of winning the first
or the second awards. With YEIP, students could receive rewards by pursuing distinguished perfor-
mance in examinations, improving examination scores, or achieving high homework grades. That
means, not only relatively advantaged students could receive an award based on performance in
examinations, but also students with little chance of winning a distinguished examination perfor-
mance award could be encouraged by the program through other channels. I thus can examine the
impacts of the conditional cash transfer program that considers multiple measures of performance
including grades on the examinations, improvement on examinations, and homework grades.
For distinguished examination performance award, students received an incentive payment of
US$48.2 (300 CNY) if they scored in the top 4% of the summed Chinese and mathematics exam-
ination scores in their class. Students received a payment of US$32.1 (200 CNY) if they scored
in the top 4-8% in the class, and received US$24.1 (150 CNY) if they scored in the top 8-12% in
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the class. The awards in this channel of the cash transfer program were received by mainly well-
performed students. For examination progress award, students received a payment of US$24.1
(150 CNY) for reaching a top 10% of improvement in their class. This award was designed to
encourage students who had little chance of winning the distinguished examination performance
award and incorporate more students in the incentive program. For the outstanding homework
award, an incentive payment of US$8.0 (50 CNY) was given to students who received a top 10%
grade in their homework assignments during the semester. Many of the students who performed
relatively poor and had never received an award before this program were eligible for an award
in the last two categories. Homework assignments are believed to help students learn the material
and prepare for the examinations and, hence, should impact examination grades as well. Tables
3.4 provides the detail of the incentive program. Students in the control group were not informed
of the treatment throughout the semester. The awards were substantial considering that disposable
income was only US$1,380 (8,595 CNY) for rural areas and most of the families in the remote
rural area had an income far below the rural average.
Table 3.4: Incentives Design
Incentive Category Criterion Incentive Amount
Distinguished Examination Performance Top 4% in class US$48.2
(300 CNY)
4-8% in class US$32.1
(200 CNY)
8-12% in class US$24.1
(150 CNY)
Examination Progress Top 10% of progress in class US$24.1
(150 CNY)
Outstanding Homework Top 10% in class US$8.0
(50 CNY)
Tables 3.5 summarizes the awards rewarded in the treatment semesters (the fall 2015 and 2016
semesters). In the fall 2015 semester, 49 students were awarded for distinguished performance on
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examinations. Additionally, 41 and 23 students received cash payments for improvement in exami-
nation performance and outstanding homework assignments respectively. In the fall 2016 semester,
73 fourth-grade students and 73 fifth-grade students received the distinguished examination perfor-
mance reward. 59 fourth-grade students were rewarded for examination progress, and 77 students
were rewarded for outstanding homework. 59 fifth-graders won awards for examination progress,
and 75 students received awards for outstanding homework.
Table 3.5: Number of Awards Granted
6th(Fall 2015) 4th(Fall 2016) 5th(Fall 2016)
Incentive Amount N Subtotal N Subtotal N Subtotal
Top 4% in class 300 CNY 12 3,600 18 5,400 16 4,800
Top 4-8% in class 200 CNY 22 4,400 22 4,400 27 5,400
Top 8-12% in class 150 CNY 15 2,250 33 4,950 30 4,500
Examination Progress 150 CNY 41 6,150 59 8,850 59 8,850
Outstanding Homework 150 CNY 23 920 77 3,850 75 3,750
Total 17,320 27,450 27,300
3.3 Empirical Results
In this essay, I focus on the reduced-form estimation of the program effect on examination
scores given scores received in the previous semester. The estimation equation is
Ei,c,k,j,t = α + β1Ei,c,k,j,t−1 + γTc,k,j,t +X
′
i,c,k,j,tζ + gradek + schoolj + εi,c,k,j,t. (3.1)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n , c = 1, 2, . . . , C, k = 1, j = 1, 2, . . . J , and t = 1, 2, . . . , T . Ei,c,k,j,t is the
normalized examination score in either Chinese or mathematics for student i in class c grade k
at school j in the program semester, i.e. the fall 2015 and fall 2016 semesters, and Ei,c,k,j,t−1 is
the normalized score for student i in class c grade k at school j in the baseline semester, i.e. the
spring 2015 and spring 2016 semesters. Tc,k,j,t is the treatment class indicator, and the coefficient γ
captures the average treatment effects on the student who was offered incentive payments based on
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multiple measures of performance. X ′i,c,k,j,t is a vector that includes the individual, household, and
class controls. schoolj is the school fixed effect indicator. gradek is the grade fixed effect indicator.
The variable grade is included when I analyze the effects of conditional cash transfer program for
the fall 2016 semester since both fourth- and fifth-grade students were offered incentive payments
if specific conditions were met (gradek = 1 if students came from fifth-grade in the fall 2016
semester). The error term εi,c,k,j,t captures unobserved individual characteristics or idiosyncratic
shocks.
Furthermore, I am interested in the heterogeneous treatment effects among students with dif-
ferent baseline performance. I add interaction terms of the baseline performance quartile and the
incentive treatment to evaluate the heterogeneous effects among students with various baseline
performance. I estimate the following equation:
Ei,c,k,j,t =α
′ + β′12Third quartile of Ei,c,k,j,t−1 + β
′
13Second quartile of Ei,c,k,j,t−1
+ β′14Top quartile of Ei,c,k,j,t−1 + γ
′
11Bottom quartile of Ei,c,k,j,t−1 × Tc,k,j,t
+ γ′12Third quartile of Ei,c,k,j,t−1 × Tc,k,j,t + γ′13Second quartile of Ei,c,k,j,t−1 × Tc,k,j,t
+ γ′14Top quartile of Ei,c,k,j,t−1 × Tc,k,j,t +X ′i,c,k,j,tζ ′ + gradek + schoolj + εi,c,k,j,t.
(3.2)
where the bottom, third, second, and top quartiles of Ei,c,k,j,t−1 indexes the quartile of achievement
for students in pre-treatment test scores. Other definitions of variables for equation (3.2) are the
same with those for equation (3.1).
3.3.1 Treatment Effects on Chinese Examination
Table 3.6 reports the regression estimates of regression (3.1) when the dependent variable is
the normalized score in Chinese received at the end of the program semester, i.e., the fall 2015 and
fall 2016 semesters. Student individual, household, and class features are listed in Table 3.3 and
are all included in the regression analysis. The first two columns show the coefficient estimates for
equations (3.1) and (3.2) for the sixth-grade students in the fall 2015 semester. The baseline well
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predicted the score in the treatment semester, and the incentive significantly raised score in Chinese
by 0.133 standard deviations. I further examine how the incentive affected scores heterogeneously
according to the baseline score in the previous semester by estimating equation (3.2). The estimates
are shown in the second column. I find that the incentives had demonstrated a positive effect on
the score especially, particularly for students with a bottom quartile baseline performance with an
estimate of 0.367 standard deviations. For students with a baseline score that was in the third,
second, and top quartiles, the impact of the incentives was not deterministic or significant.
In the third column, I find that the baseline score played an essential role in determining the
score in the program semester. Differing than the fall 2015 sample, the estimates show that the in-
centives did not increase the score for the fourth- and fifth-grade students in the fall 2016 semester.
I also investigate if the incentives affected scores heterogeneously according to the baseline score
in the previous semester in the fourth column. Although the incentives demonstrated a positive
effect on the score for students in the bottom quartile of baseline performance (0.134 standard
deviations), large standard errors produce an insignificant effect.
3.3.2 Treatment Effects on Mathematics Examination
I now discuss regression analysis of the impacts of the incentives on student performance in
Mathematics in Table 3.7. Similarly, baseline mathematics score was a strong predictor of mathe-
matics score in the program semester for students in both the fall 2015 and fall 2016 samples, see
column 1 and column 3. The first column shows that the treatment increased score in mathemat-
ics by 0.306 standard deviations for the six-grade students in the fall 2015 sample. Furthermore,
the second column shows that there was a significant positive impact of 0.525 standard deviations
for students a bottom quartile baseline score and a smaller effect of 0.170 standard deviations for
students with a third quartile baseline score. The effects of the incentives on the score for students
with second and top quartile baseline performance were not significant.
I then examine the effect of the treatment on the score for the fourth- and fifth-grade students in
the fall 2016 sample. The impact was negative but not significant. I again investigate the possible







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































for students with lower baseline scores and negative for students with higher baseline scores, the
effects were insignificant throughout all different baseline quartiles.
3.4 Conclusion
I evaluate the impact of the YEIP implemented in Mabian Yi Autonomous County. Mabian Yi
Autonomous County is a relatively poor county located in southwest China’s Sichuan province.
The estimates show the desired results regarding the impact of the incentive program for the sam-
ple with balanced characteristics. In contrast to the results found by Bettinger (2012), students
who already performed well were most incentivized by the pay-for-performance program, the cash
incentive program in Mabian Yi Autonomous County demonstrated the most significant effect for
students with relatively poor baseline performance. For the fall 2016 sample in which characteris-
tics were not balanced, I do not observe an impact of the conditional cash transfer program on any
test scores.
I am currently in the process of obtaining the post-treatment academic performance for students
in my analysis. Using the post-treatment performance data, I plan to explore the longer-term
impacts of the conditional cash program by estimating the score differences in junior high school
after students graduated from the primary school between students in the control and treatment
groups. Results from these data will provide additional insight into the full range of impacts










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This dissertation includes two independent essays. In the first essay, I employ a selection
bias correction and equivalence scale method to estimate the costs of raising children that consider
economies of scale enjoyed by a couple living with children. The second essay evaluates the impact
of a social experiment that designed to improve youth’s academic achievement in a neediest area
through conditional cash transfers. Below I summarize these two essays.
The Chinese government replaced the 35-year-old one-child policy with a two-child policy on
January 1, 2016. A number of studies have been interested in the impact of the recent change in
the family planning policy in China. The new policy raised births by 1.31 million in China in 2016
shortly. Births then decreased by 0.63 million in 2017. The government originally estimated the
new policy would increase 3 million newborns annually in the five or six years following the policy
change. The increase in 2016 fell far short of the government’s target and could not compensate
the decrease in the willingness of having a first child. According to fertility intention and behavior
surveys conducted in China, the low willingness of having a child or having an additional child
was attributed to the high costs of raising children. Cost estimates of raising children can provide
an important insight into how children affect family economic decisions. In China, couples with
two children are over-represented by a low-educated, rural, and sons-preferred population. This
is commonly attributed to an exemption in the one-child policy: only particular couples could
have a second child, and these couples were disadvantaged, lived in rural areas, and had a strong
preference for sons. Using data from the CHFS conducted in 2011, I employ a selection bias
correction and equivalence scale method to estimate the costs of raising children that consider
economies of scale enjoyed by a couple living with children. I find no difference between the costs
of raising a son and a daughter for a representative one-child family. The marginal cost of raising
an additional child was higher for a representative couple with a firstborn daughter and a second-
born son than a couple with children of the same gender. To raise an additional child, on average,
the cost was higher for an urban family than a rural one, and the cost was higher for a couple with
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more years of schooling than one with fewer years of education.
Besides the family planning policy, another subject-matter is China’s unequal access to edu-
cational resources among children from different backgrounds. Many countries have introduced
conditional cash transfer programs, which provide incentives to relatively disadvantaged individ-
uals or households when specific requirements are met. I evaluate the impact of the YEIP that
designed to improve youth’s academic achievement in a neediest area through conditional cash
transfers. The estimates show that the incentive had positive impacts on student performance in
both standardized Chinese and mathematics examinations when using a sample with balanced
characteristics. I also estimate the impacts by baseline performance and find the most significant
effects of the monetary incentives for students with a relatively low baseline score while finding no
significant impacts for students with a relatively high baseline score. Results using a sample with
unbalanced characteristics yield no significant impacts across different baseline scores.
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